Crediting Prisoners Sentenced Before 1960 With Preconviction Incarceration Time by Editors,
[Vol.118
CREDITING PRISONERS SENTENCED BEFORE 1960
WITH PRECONVICTION INCARCERATION TIME
In areas of social policy covered by a statute, judicial creativity is
often thought to be limited to filling interstices in the legislation. The
recent case of Sobell v. United States,' however, demonstrates how a
series of judicial acts designed to fill in the gaps, although always in
light of congressional "intent," can bury the statute involved.
Morton Sobell was convicted in 1951 of violating the Espionage
Act' and was sentenced to thirty years in prison, the statutory maxi-
mum term for the offense. The statute under which he was convicted
did not provide for a minimum mandatory sentence. Prior to his con-
viction, he was held for seven and a half months for failure to post bail,
which had been set at $100,000. At the time of his sentencing, the
statutory provision determining the date on which service of sentence
began did not expressly give credit for time spent in custody prior to
sentencing for inability to make bail.' However, in 1960, Congress
amended the statute involved to provide "credit toward service of . . .
sentence for any days spent in custody prior to the imposition of sen-
tence . . . for want of bail . . . where the statute requires the imposi-
tion of a minimum mandatory sentence." ' The amendment by its
terms had no retroactive effect.5
In 1968, Sobell sought to correct the thirty-year sentence by gaining
credit for the time he spent in presentence custody. The district court
denied relief.' The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that the 1960 amendment to section 3568 required that credit
1407 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1969).
2Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 2, 40 Stat. 217, 218-219, as amended, 18
U.S.C. § 794 (1964).
SAct of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 3568, 62 Stat. 838, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3568
(Supp. III, 1965-67). The complete text reads:
The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense in a
court of the United States shall commence to run from the date on which such
person is received at the penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of
said sentence.
4Act of Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. 86-691, § 1(a), 74 Stat. 738, amending, Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 3568, 62 Stat. 838 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1964)). The
amendment was simply added to the existing language of § 3568 in the form of a
proviso. It read as follows:
Provided, That the Attorney General shall give any such person credit toward
service of his sentence for any days spent in custody prior to the imposition
of sentence by the sentencing court for want of bail set for the offense under
which sentence was imposed where the statute requires the imposition of a
minimum mandatory sentence.
5Id. §2.
DSobell v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The action was
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964), which in part provides that where the sentence
was imposed "in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States" or "was
in excess of the maximum authorized by law," the defendant "may move the court
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."
(280)
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for time spent in presentence custody for want of bail be given where
the sentence was imposed before 1960 for an offense not requiring a
minimum mandatory sentence.7
The Second Circuit's reasoning relied upon Stapf v. United States,'
which had construed the 1960 amendment to require courts to give
credit for time spent in presentence custody to all prisoners sentenced
between 1960 and 1966' who could not possibly have received such
credit at the time of sentencing."' With a regrettable lack of explanation,
the court simply asserted that the rationale of Stapf applied to prisoners
sentenced before 1960,11 despite the fact that the amendment did not
apply retroactively. 2
A. Prior Interpretation of the 1960 Amendment
As the Sobell court recognized, Stapf is the leading decision inter-
preting the 1960 amendment to section 3568. While several courts re-
fused to follow its interpretation,. many accepted it, 4 and the Federal
Bureau of Prisons eventually promulgated uniform regulations in
accord.-" The decision itself rested on two grounds: the congressional
intent in drawing up the amendment, and avoidance of an equal pro-
tection issue that would have been raised by a contrary interpretation.
In Stapf the court argued that Congress, in drafting the amend-
ment, wished to remedy a particular evil, not create a new one. It
stated that although federal courts usually gave credit for time spent in
presentence custody, they did not do so where a minimum mandatory
7 407 F2d at 182. There was technically no majority opinion in Sobell. The
holding given in the text is from the opinion of Judge Hays. In a concurring opinion,
Judge Moore based his decision to grant presentence credit on his interpretation of
the language used by the trial judge at the time of sentencing. Id. at 183-84. Judge
Friendly concurred in both opinions. Id. at 185. Since the concurring opinion of
Judge Moore raises no issues of general significance, it is not discussed. In addition,
the holding in Judge Hays's opinion limited credit to cases in which it was mathe-
matically impossible that the sentencing judge had given credit. Thus, credit could be
given only when the sentence imposed plus the time spent in presentence custody
added up to more than the statutory maximum sentence permitted for the offense.
Id. at 183 n.8.
8 367 F2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
9 After 1966, all federal prisoners automatically received administrative credit
toward service of sentence for time spent in presentence custody. 18 U.S.C. § 3568
(Supp. III, 1965-67), amending, 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1964).
10 367 F2d at 330. Most subsequent decisions followed the policy laid down in
Stap of not giving credit for time spent in presentence custody, unless it was mathe-
matically impossible that the sentencing court had done so. E.g., Bryans v. Black-
well, 387 F2d 764 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 907 (1968). Contra, Padgett
v. United States, 387 F2d 649 (4th Cir. 1967) (mem.).
"1407 F2d at 182-83.
12 Act of Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. 86-691, § 2, 74 Stat. 738.
13 Allen v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 420 (M.D. Pa. 1966) (mem.) ; see United
States ex rel. Sacco v. Kenton, 386 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1967); Sawyer v. United States,
376 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
14 Lee v. United States, 400 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Smith,
379 F.2d 628 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 993 (1967); Dunn v. United States,
376 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Pratt, 276 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1967).
15 Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement No. 7600.49A.
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sentence was imposed, since it was thought that they lacked the authority
to sentence a person to less than the required term."6 The result was
that defendants unable to make bail in such cases were incarcerated
longer than defendants who could make bail. To remedy this inequality
in treatment, the 1960 amendment was passed.
At the same time, however, this amendment apparently created a
new inequality of treatment: prisoners convicted of an offense requiring
the imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence automatically received
administrative credit for time spent in presentence custody, while pris-
oners convicted of lesser offenses had to depend upon the discretion of
the sentencing court. To avoid such an interpretation, the court argued
that Congress had assumed that credit was given by the sentencing court
as a matter of course where the offense did not require a minimum
mandatory sentence and thus did not deal with such cases in the amend-
ment.17 This reading of the Congressional "state of mind" at the time
the amendment was drafted is quite plausible.' But the court also
argued that the 1960 amendment implicitly approved the assumed sen-
tencing practice of federal courts and that courts were now bound to
act in accord with this legislative assumption. Courts were thus statu-
torily obligated to give presentence credit in cases not involving a
minimum mandatory sentence.
Underlying the Congressional intent argument was the issue of
equal protection.' It would be arbitrary, irrational, and therefore un-
constitutional, the court argued, to give credit automatically in cases
requiring a minimum mandatory sentence when it could be denied in
cases involving lesser offenses. The application of such an irrational
distinction would violate the constitutional standard of equal protection.
Since it was possible to construe the statute to avoid this constitutional
issue, the court reasoned that it ought to do so. Therefore, it had a duty
to give credit for time spent in presentence custody to all prisoners
sentenced between 1960 and 1966 who could not possibly have received
such credit at the time of sentencing." Congressional intent and the
:6See 367 F2d at 328; Williams v. United States, 335 F2d 290 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(defendant sentenced in 1957 for an offense involving a minimum mandatory sentence
denied credit for time spent in presentence custody) ; H. P, REP. No. 2058, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1960).
17 367 F2d at 328.
IsSee S. REP. No. 1696, 86th Cong., 2d Sess (1960) ; H.R. RaP. No. 2058, .supra
note 16. But see Byers v. United States, 175 F2d 654 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
340 U. S. 949 (1951). The court stated that the defendant "was not entitled, as a
matter of right, to have credit for the time he was in custody prior to sentencing, for
his sentence would not commence to run until it had been imposed and he was received
at the place designated for the service thereof." Id. at 656.
19 367 F2d at 328-29. Since the case involved federal law, the concept of equal
protection was applied through the fifth amendment. See note 35, infra.
20 Id. at 330. The court stated that whenever it was mathematically possible
that credit had been given for presentence custody, i.e., the sentence actually given
was less than the difference between the maximum sentence and the time spent in
presentence custody, it would be presumed that credit had been given. However, since
Stapf had received the maximum sentence, such a presumption could not be entertained.
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fifth amendment were thus harmonized and an irrational gap in the
1960 amendment filled.
B. Legislative History of the 1960 Amendment
The bill amending section 3568 was first introduced in the Senate.
The proposed amendment was much broader than the version eventually
adopted and would have given "credit toward service of . . . sentence
for any days spent in custody for want of bail set for the offense under
which sentence was imposed." 21 Despite the broad coverage of the
bill, its purpose as stated in the report was to eliminate only the disparity
in treatment under statutes requiring a minimum mandatory sentence
between those who could and those who could not make bail.22 The
bill was not intended to deal with possible unfairness to all defendants
unable to make bail.
The language of the House amendment-the version eventually
adopted-focused more specifically on the disparity in cases involving a
minimum mandatory sentence. It stated:
Provided, That the Attorney General shall give any such per-
son [convicted of an offense in a court of the United States]
credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in
custody prior to the imposition of sentence by the sentencing
court for want of bail set for the offense under which sentence
was imposed where the statute requires the imposition of a
minimum mandatory sentence.2
The purpose of the House amendment remained the same as the
Senate's: to eliminate the disparity in treatment under statutes requiring
a minimum mandatory sentence between those who could and those
who could not make bail.2" However, "[i]n order to clarify the intent,
it was decided to expressly spell out in the text of the bill the fact that
this provision applies where the statute requires the imposition of a
minimum mandatory sentence." '
The only recorded comment concerning the significance of the
difference between the two bills by a member of Congress was made
when the then Senator Johnson put the amended bill before the Senate
for a vote. He stated that "the House amendment is in the nature of a
substitute . . . and provides that the application of the statute is only
in those cases which involve the imposition of a minimum mandatory
sentence." 26
Despite Senator Johnson's remarks, it does not appear that the
House amended bill resulted from a conscious intention to deny adminis-
21 S. RE. No. 1696, supra note 18, at 2.
22d.
23H.R. REP. No. 2058, supra note 16, at 2 (emphasis added).
24d.
51d.
20 106 CONG. RFc. 17464 (1960) (emphasis added).
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trative credit for time spent in presentence custody to defendants con-
victed of an offense not requiring the imposition of a minimum manda-
tory sentence. The intent was rather "to clarify" the Senate bill to
insure that defendants subject to a minimum mandatory sentence would
receive such credit, since it was assumed that they were the only de-
fendants denied credit as a matter of course. The amended bill was not
narrower in purpose than the original version; the language of the
original version was simply amended to bring it into line with its stated
purpose. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the language of the House
amendment limited application of the statute to cases involving a mini-
mum mandatory sentence.
While the "evil" that Congress hoped to remedy is thus clear, much
less clear is Congress's assumption about the sentencing practice of
federal courts at that time. All that can be unequivocally argued is that
Congress left those sentencing practices untouched. The only explicit
statutory directive was that credit be given in cases involving minimum
mandatory sentences and this was aimed at an administrative agency,
not the courts. Section 3568 remained otherwise unaltered.
This legislative history indicates that Congress in drawing up the
1960 amendment focused its attention on one aspect of a problem and
ignored the rest of it, thereby fortuitously creating a classificatory
scheme for sentencing as arbitrary and irrational as the one which pre-
ceded it.2" Faced with the task of applying this scheme in a rational
manner, the court in Stapf ignored the language of the statute and
looked at Congress's intent and erroneous assumptions in drawing it up.
The resulting decision was more equitable than a literal application of
the statute would have been.
C. Equal Protection
Even if one accepts the decision in Stapf, the result in Sobell does
not follow inexorably. Although the court in Sobell ostensibly avoided
the constitutional issue of equal protection,"9 its entire argument rested
on a case (Stapf) in which the equal protection issue was decisive. But
that specific issue was not present in Sobell. No equal protection argu-
ment with regard to the statute could be raised for sentences imposed
prior to 1960, since the amendment did not then exist and it expressly
did not apply retroactively. The reasoning of the Stapf case simply does
not apply to the situation which confronted the court in Sobell. The
27 Notes 3 & 4 supra.
2
8The Senate report on a bill designed in part to amend § 3568 tacitly acknowl-
edged the irrationality of the scheme created by the 1960 amendment:
It is ironic that persons accused of such serious crimes [those for which there
is a minimum mandatory sentence] should be assured of receiving credit for
pretrial custody, while those convicted of less serious crimes for which no
minimum mandatory sentence is required have the benefit of no such assurance.
S. REP. No. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1965).
29 407 F2d at 181.
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court which sentenced Morton Sobell in 1951 did not have to concern
itself with the danger of enforcing an irrational and illogical distinction,
since the distinction had not yet been made. Moreover, the court in
Sobell admitted the weakness of its argument when it stated that prior
to 1960, section 3568 "did not on its face require that any prisoner be
given credit for presentence time spent in custody." "
Nevertheless, the result in Sobell is still correct. Although not dis-
cussed by the court, there is a valid equal protection argument, which
was raised by the appellant's counsel: " the denial of credit for time
spent in presentence custody violates equal protection by imposing on a
defendant financially unable to make bail a total term of incarceration
different from that imposed on a wealthier defendant.
This inequality of treatment is analogous to that condemned by a
line of cases beginning with Griffin v. Illinois.3 2 In that case the
Supreme Court held that a state statute providing full appellate review
of criminal convictions only upon presentation of a transcript which
must be paid for by the appellant violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment when the effect of the requirement was to
deny full appellate review to the indigent. The Court held that indigent
defendants must be granted the same access to review as that provided
to defendants with enough money to purchase a transcript.33
The decision in Griffin indicates that if the government grants a
legal right which can affect the length of imprisonment (such as the
right to appellate review) in a manner which produces unequal results
because of the economic status of some defendants, then the government
has an affirmative duty to cure the inequality. 4 Applied to the present
case,33 this reasoning leads to the conclusion that the denial of pre-
sentence incarceration credit deprived Sobell of equal protection. Sobell
Old.; see Byers v. United States, 175 F2d 654 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 949 (1951).
31 407 F2d at 181; Brief for Appellant at 13-18, Sobell v. Unted States, 407 F2d
180 (2d Cir. 1969).
32 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See generally Comment, Equal Protection and the Indi-
gent Defendant: Griffin and Its Progeny, 16 STAN. L. REv. 394 (1964).
33 351 U.S. at 19.
34 See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065,
1177-1180 (1969).
35At least some of the requirements which the equal protection clause imposes
on the states are applicable to the federal government via the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) ; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954). The Supreme Court has explicitly refrained from holding that all
the requirements of fourteenth amendment equal protection are incorporated in fifth
amendment due process, limiting itself to the statement that "discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Id. at 499. In holding unconstitutional
racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia, the Court said in
Bolling that "[c]lassifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with par-
ticular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally
suspect." Id. No less can be said about classifications based on wealth affecting the
length of time criminal defendants spend in prison. Bolling also states that liberty
cannot, under the due process clause of the fifth amendment, "be restricted except for
a proper governmental objective," id. at 499-500, reasoning which is equally applicable
to cases like Sobell in which the length of imprisonment depends on wealth. For
these reasons, precedents developed under the fourteenth amendment equal protection
clause should be treated as fully applicable to the federal government in this area.
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was sentenced without regard to his presentence confinement, which was
the result of inability to make bail. Thus, had relief been denied, he
would have had to spend a longer aggregate amount of time in jail than
one who could afford bail." The evil in such a case is similar to that
condemned in Griffin. The poorer defendant is obliged to suffer im-
prisonment which he would be spared were he richer."
A possible objection to this reasoning is that time spent in prison
for failure to make bail differs in purpose from time spent in prison
after conviction for a crime.38 Presentence imprisonment is designed to
insure the presence of the accused at trial; imprisonment after con-
viction is designed to serve the various different purposes of punishment.
Although this distinction may be relevant in other contexts, its use here
is inappropriate. It may be true that at the time bail is fixed it is not
unconstitutional to treat persons accused of crimes in different ways,
if the unequal treatment is necessary to insure the presence of the de-
fendants at trial. Since the determination has been made that bail is
necessary to assure the defendant's presence at trial, the inequality in-
herent in imprisoning the indigent for that reason is legitimate because
unavoidable. However, when the defendant is sentenced the state has
the opportunity to correct this unequal treatment, by reduction of the
length of sentence. This reduction insures that the total length of time
spent in prison for the two purposes of assurance of presence at trial and
of punishment will not differ on the basis of whether the defendant is
rich or poor. The failure of the state to correct the unequal treatment
is a denial of the equal protection of the laws, just as the failure of
Illinois to provide the indigent defendant with appellate review, when
it was provided to others, was a similar denial."9
3 6That Sobell was sentenced prior to the decision in Griffin raises no problem.
Griffin has been held to apply retroactively. Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of
Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam).
37 In the case of defendants unable to make bail but thereafter released and
acquitted, a similar inequality exists. But if setting bail is necessary to assure a
defendant's appearance at trial, there is no way to serve this purpose without incarcer-
ating the indigent defendant. His treatment, although unequal, serves a compelling
governmental interest. This is not the case where conviction and imposition of sentence
provides an opportunity to rectify the unequal treatment.3 8 See Brief for Appellee at 10-11, Sobell v. United States, 407 F2d 180 (2d
Cir. 1969).
39 Both briefs in the Sobell case raised the possibility that Sobell's failure to
post bail was due to some unspecified reason other than financial inability. Brief
for Appellant at 17-18, Brief for Appellee at 10, Sobell v. United States, 407 F2d
180 (2d Cir. 1969). Here again an ostensibly neutral sentencing rule may produce
different results when applied to different defendants. Where the defendant freely
chooses not to make bail, that choice, rather than the rule denying credit, is the origin
of the unequal treatment, and there would be no basis for arguing a denial of equal
protection. Where the reason for the failure to post bail is beyond the defendant's
control, but unrelated to his economic status, the reasoning of Griffin may not be
applicable, since the chief concern there was the unequal treatment accorded indigent
defendants. However, it may be argued that a failure to give credit in the latter
situation violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Brief for
Appellant at 17-18, Sobell v. United States, 407 F2d 180 (2d Cir. 1969). To base
a determination of the total length of time spent in prison on a factor as arbitrary and
varying as the length of time spent in presentence custody is arguably capricious and
irrational, and thus a violation of due process.
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CONCLUSION
The court may have avoided basing its decision on such an argument
because of the impact it would have had on state, as well as federal sen-
tencing practice. Nonetheless, the unequal treatment accorded Sobell
in requiring him to serve the maximum term for the offense plus the
seven and a half months spent in presentence custody for inability to
make bail was the issue in the case, not the interpretation of an amend-
ment which could not possibly have applied in 1951. Had the court
faced this issue, it could have written an opinion less offensive to logic
and with an equally equitable result-freedom for Sobell. Instead, al-
though the amendment is limited by its terms to requiring credit for
time spent in presentence custody to prisoners sentenced after 1960 for
offenses imposing a minimum mandatory sentence, it was used to give
credit to a prisoner sentenced in 1951 for an offense imposing no
minimum mandatory sentence. Even a repealed amendment deserves
more respect than this. Hopefully, future decisions on cases like Sobell's
will face the issue involved.
